Philosophers of science have failed to draw the full conclusions from the criticism of the neopositivist model of scientific enquiry. Realising that science does not fit this model they have agreed that, well, "that's just too bad for science". The constructivists, often guided by ideological considerations, have refused to grant it exclusive epistemological status (in comparison to myths, art or literature). The rest try to show its superiority while avoiding the classical conception of truth and replacing it with various surrogates. However, the criticism of that model makes it clear that science not only does not but could not fulfil the conditions set by that model because, being an expression of absolutist conceptions of certainty, it asks it to achieve the impossible. What is more, the conditions are arbitrary. This calls for the only justifiable conclusion---too bad for the model. Coming to this conclusion is the beginning of a long and difficult process of re-evaluation, the construction of new conceptual schemes, new definitions and new criteria. This is the task the philosopher of science must face.

1. Elzbieta Kaluszynska: Realism At The End Of The Century (PDF file, 272K)

2. Marta Bucholc: The Epistemology of the Strong Program in Sociology of Knowledge (PDF file, 260K)

3. Tomasz Bigaj: Field's Program: Defence (PDF file, 239K)

4. R. Zych: Foundationalism in Archeology And The Postmodernist Turn (PDF file, 197K)

5. E. Kaluszynska: A Cascading Structure of Science (PDF file, 244K)

6. T. Bigaj:  The Common Cause Explanation for Quantum Correlations of the EPR Type  (PDF file, 253K)
 

The growing body of information about the functioning of human, animal and artificial cognition puts philosophers in a difficult position. Reflection about the nature of our own minds has long been the most cherished of philosophical topics. Is contemporary philosophy prepared to assimilate evidence coming from cognitive science? Can it accomodate traditional philosophical concepts to this task without abandoning or compromizing its essential goals? It is often stated that the prevailing philosophical framework of today's cognitive theories is still Cartesian, thus being at odds with the crucial achievement of contemporary philosophy. Is this really so? And if it is so, what can be done about it? This section of JTB invites articles coping with these problems.

1. Robert Pilat: The Problem of 3D Vision in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science PDF file, 135K)

2. Robert Pilat: Colour Names and the Concepts of Colours (253K)

1. Ryszard Wojcicki: Discourse

2. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski: Commentary on Wójcicki: Not Pragmatic Enough (Comments to [1])

3. Vincent F. Hendricks: Modal Operator Theory (PDF file, 333K)  

Justification

2. Jan Czerniawski: Internalism or Psychologisms (Comments to [1])

3. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski: Predictive Error and Realism;
Also: PDF version (102K)

4. Artur Koterski: Juhos and Konstatierungen (PDF file, 168K)

5. Tadeusz Szubka: Justificationist And Pragmatic Theory Of Meaning: Prospects And Problems (PDF file, 133K)

6. Pawel Kawalec: Back to Green Perspectives on Confirmation as Justification (PDF file, 213K)
 

1. Ryszard Wojcicki: Tarski on Defenition of Truth

2. Eleonora Orlando: On the Philosophical Interpretation of Tarski´s Definition of Truth. Comments to A Paper by R. Wojcicki

3. Ryszard Wojcicki: Fallacies in Non-rigorous Thinking

4. Eduardo Rabossi: Some Comments on Wojcicki's "Fallacies in Non-rigorous Thinking"

5. Elzbieta Kaluszynska: Two Notions of Truthfulness (PDF file, 205K)